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Harta bătăliei de la jumătatea superioară a lui Fredericksburg

Harta bătăliei de la jumătatea superioară a lui Fredericksburg



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Harta bătăliei de la jumătatea superioară a Fredericksburg

Harta bătăliei de la jumătatea superioară a lui Fredericksburg

Jumătatea de sus - Harta completă - Jumătatea de jos

Harta luată din Bătălii și lideri ai războiului civil: III: retragere de la Gettysburg, p.74

Revenirea la bătălia de la Fredericksburg



Ranguri militare Edit

  • MG = General-maior
  • BG = General de brigadă
  • Col = Colonel
  • Ltc = Locotenent colonel
  • Maj = Maior
  • Cpt = Căpitan
  • Lt = Locotenent 1

Altă editare

Unități ale sediului general Edit

  • Oneida (New York) Cavalerie: Cpt Daniel P. Mann, Companii. BCH & ampI: Cpt Marcus A. Reno, Companiile A și E: Cpt James B. McIntyre
  • Sturgis (Illinois) Rifles: Cpt James Steel
  • 22 New Jersey
  • 29 New Jersey
  • 30 New Jersey
  • 31 New Jersey
  • 9 Infanterie New York, Compania G: Cpt Charles Copil: Col John S. Crocker
  • 147 New York: Maj Charles J. Whiting (5 companii): Cpt Royal T. Frank

Brigada inginerilor voluntari: BG Daniel Phineas Woodbury

  • 15 New York: Col John M. Murphy
  • 50 New York: Ltc William H. Pettes: Cpt James C. Duane
    : Cpt Elijah D. Taft
  • Bateria A, Batalionul 1 New York Light: Cpt Otto Diederichs
  • Bateria B, Batalionul 1 New York Light: Cpt Adolph Voegelee
  • Bateria C, Batalionul 1 New York Light: Lt Bernhard Wever
  • Bateria D, Batalionul 1 New York Light: Cpt Charles Kusserow: Cpt William M. Graham
  • Bateria A, 2 Statele Unite: Cpt John C. Tidball: Lt Marcus P. Miller: Lt David H. Kinzie
  • 32 Infanterie Massachusetts, Compania C: Cpt Josiah C. Fuller

Artilerie neatasată: Maj Thomas S. Trumbull

Marea divizie dreapta Edit

Corpul II Edit


BG John C. Caldwell (w)
Col George W. Von Schack

    : Col Edward E. Cross (w), Maj Edward E. Sturtevant (k), Cpt James E. Larkin (w), Cpt Horace T. H. Pierce: Col John E. Bendix (w), Lt. Col. George W. von Schack, Cpt G. A. von Bransen: Col Nelson A. Miles (w): Ltc Enos C. Brooks (w): Col H. Boyd McKeen (w), Cpt William Wilson: Col Hiram L. Brown (w), Ltc David B. McCreary
    : Col Richard Byrnes: Ltc Richard C. Bentley (w), Maj Joseph O'Neill (w), Cpt Patrick J. Condon: Col Robert Nugent (w), Cpt James Saunders: Col Patrick Kelly: Col Dennis Heenan (w), Ltc St. Clair Augustine Mulholland (w), Lt Francis T. Quinlan
    : Col Richard S. Bostwick: Col William P. Bailey (w): Col Paul Frank: Ltc Alford B. Chapman (w), Maj. N. Garrow Throop (mw), Cpt James W. Britt: Ltc James H. Bull (k), Cpt Julius Wehle (k), Cpt John S. Hammell (w), Lt James G. Derrickson: Col John R. Brooke
    : Cpt Rufus D. Pettit: Lt Evan Thomas
    : Col Frederick D. Sewall, Ltc Francis E. Heath: Maj Chase Philbrick (w), Cpt John Murkland, Cpt Charles H. Watson: Cpt William Plumer: Col George N. Morgan: Cpt William F. Russell: Col James A. Sutter: Ltc James Huston


Col Norman J. Hall (w)
Col William R. Lee

    : Cpt H. G. O. Weymouth (w): Cpt George N. Macy: Ltc Henry Baxter (w), Maj Thomas J. Hunt: Ltc George N. Bomford: Ltc William Northedge
  • 127-a Pennsylvania: [3] Col. William W. Jennings
    : Cpt William A. Arnold: Cpt John G. Hazard


BG Nathan Kimball (w)
Col John S. Mason

    : Maj Elijah H. C. Cavins
  • 24 New Jersey: Col William B. Robertson
  • 28 New Jersey: Col Moses N. Wisewell (w), Ltc E. A. L. Roberts: Col John S. Mason, Ltc James H. Godman (w), Cpt Gordon A. Stewart: Ltc Franklin Sawyer: Col Joseph Snider (w), Ltc Jonathan H. Lockwood
    : Ltc Sanford H. Perkins (w), Cpt Samuel H. Davis: Ltc Charles J. Puteri: Col. Henry I. Zinn (k), Cpt William M. Porter


Col. John W. Andrews [4]
Ltc William Jameson
Ltc John W. Marshall

    : Maj Thomas A. Smyth: Col John D. MacGregor (w), Ltc William Jameson, Maj Charles W. Kruger: Col John E. Bendix (w), Cpt Salmon Winchester (mw), Cpt George F. Hopper: [5] Ltc Charles Albright
    : Cpt John D. Frank: Cpt Charles D. Owen

IX Corp Edit

  • 6 Cavaleria New York, Compania B: Cpt Hillman A. Hall
  • 6 New York Cavalry, Compania C: Cpt William L. Heermance
    : Col Henry Bowman: Col Thomas Welsh: Ltc David A. Leckey
  • Bateria D, primul New York Light: Cpt Thomas W. Osborn
  • Bateriile L și M, 3 Statele Unite: Lt Horace J. Hayden
    : Col William S. Clark: Maj Sidney Willard (mw), Cpt Stephen H. Andrews: Col Walter Harriman: Col Robert Brown Potter: Col John F. Hartranft
    : Cpt Jacob Roemer: Cpt George W. Durell: Cpt William W. Buckley: Lt George Dickenson (k), Lt John Egan
    : Maj John E. Ward, Cpt Henry M. Hoyt: Col Griffin Alexander Stedman, Jr.: Ltc Samuel Tolles: Cpt Charles L. Upham: Col Arthur H. Dutton: Ltc Joseph B. Curtis (k), Maj Martin P. Buffum
    : Lt Samuel N. Benjamin: Lt James Gillies

Divizia de cavalerie Edit

  • 6 Cavaleria New York: Col. Thomas C. Devin, Ltc Duncan McVicar: Ltc Amos E. Griffiths: Cpt George C. Cram
  • Bateria M, a 2-a Statele Unite: Lt Alexander C. M. Pennington, Jr.

Centre Grand Division Edit

Corpul III Edit

    : Col John Van Valkenburg: Maj John A. Danks: Col Andrew H. Tippin: Col Amor A. McKnight: Col Charles H. T. Collis: Col Henry J. Madill
    : Col. Moses B. Lakeman: col. Elijah Walker
  • 38 New York: Ltc William Birney (w): Ltc Nelson A. Gesner (w): Col Regis de Trobriand: Col Charles T. Campbell (w), Ltc Peter Sides: Col Asher S. Leidy (w), Ltc Edwin Ruthwin Biles
    : Col Thomas A. Roberts: Maj Moses B. Houghton: Ltc John Gilluly (k), Maj Edward T. Sherlock: Col J. Frederick Pierson: Col Samuel B. Hayman: Col George F. Chester
    : Ltc Clark B. Baldwin, Col. Napoleon B. McLaughlen: Col. William E. Blaisdell: Col. Thomas R. Tannatt: Col. Gilman Marston: Col. Robert McAllister: Lt. Benjamin C. Tilghman
    : Cpt A. Judson Clark
  • 4th Battery, New York Light: Lt. Joseph E. Nairn
  • Bateria H, 1 Statele Unite: Lt Justin E. Dimick: Lt Francis W. Seeley
    : Col Joseph H. Potter: Maj James J. Byrne: Col Samuel M. Bowman: Ltc James Crowther
  • 10th Battery, New York Light: Cpt John T. Bruen: Cpt Albert A. Von Puttkammer: Lt George W. Norton

Corpul V Edit

    : Ltc George Varney (w), Maj Daniel F. Sargent
  • Massachusetts Sharpshooters, a doua companie: Cpt Lewis E. Wentworth: Ltc Joseph Hayes: Ltc William S. Tilton: Ltc Ira C. Abbott (w): Col Elisha Marshall (w), Ltc Francis A. Schoeffel: Cpt Patrick Connelly: Ltc James Gwyn
    : Col Adelbert Ames, Ltc Joshua L. Chamberlain: Lt Jonas H. Titus Jr.: Ltc Norval E. Welch: Ltc Robert M. Richardson: Cpt John Vickers: Ltc Freeman Conner (w), Maj Edward B. Knox: Col Strong Vincent
    : Cpt Augustus Pearl Martin
  • A 5-a baterie (E), Massachusetts Light: Cpt Charles A. Phillips: Cpt Richard Waterman: Lt Charles E. Hazlett
  • 1 Statele Unite: Ltc Casper Trepp
    : Cpt John D. Wilkins: Cpt Hiram Dryer, Batalionul 1: Cpt Matthew M. Blunt
  • 12 Statele Unite, Batalionul 2: Cpt Thomas M. Anderson, Batalionul 1: Cpt John D. O'Connell
  • 14 Statele Unite, Batalionul 2: Cpt Giles B. Overton


Maj George L. Andrews
Maj Charles S. Lovell

    și al 2-lea Statele Unite (batalion): Cpt Salem S. Marsh: Cpt Levi C. Bootes: Cpt David P. Hancock: Cpt Henry E. Maynadier: Cpt Charles S. Russell și al 19-lea Statele Unite (batalion): Cpt John P. Wales
    : Col John B. Clark: Ltc William B. Shaut: Col Franklin B. Speakman: Col Edward J. Allen
    : Lt William H. Phillips
  • Baterii E și G, 1 Statele Unite: Cpt Alanson Merwin Randol [13]
    : Col Horace B. Sargent
  • A treia cavalerie din Pennsylvania: Ltc Edward S. Jones: Col James K. Kerr: Cpt James E. Harrison
  • Bateriile B și L, 2 Statele Unite: Cpt James M. Robertson

Stânga Grand Division Edit

Corpul I Edit

    : Ltc John McKie, Jr.: Ltc Samuel R. Beardsley: Ltc Morgan H. Chrysler: Ltc William H. de Bevoise: Maj Homer R. Stoughton


Cpt George A. Gerrish (w)
Cpt John A. Reynolds


BG John Gibbon (w)
BG Nelson Taylor

    : Ltc Charles W. Tilden: Maj John A. Kress: Maj Gilbert G. Prey: Maj Daniel A. Sharp (w), Cpt Abraham Moore: Col Thomas F. McCoy


BG Nelson Taylor
Col Samuel H. Leonard

    : Col Samuel H. Leonard, Ltc N. Walter Batchelder: Cpt John Hendrickson (w), Cpt Joseph A. Moesch (w), Locotenent Isaac E. Hoagland, locotenent Henry P. Claire: col. Charles Wheelock: col. Richard Coulter (w), Cpt Christian Kuhn: Maj David A. Griffith
    : Cpt William C. Talley: Col William McCandless, Cpt Timothy Mealey: Maj Wellington H. Ent: Cpt Charles F. Taylor (w), Cpt Edward Irvin (w): Col Chapman Biddle
    : Col Horatio G. Sickel: Ltc Richard H. Woolworth: Col Henry C. Bolinger (w): Maj Silas M. Baily: Col Robert P. Cummins
    : Col Joseph W. Fisher, Ltc George Dare (w), Maj Frank Zentemeyer (mw): Ltc Robert Anderson, Maj James M. Snodgrass: Maj James B. Knox: Ltc Samuel M. Jackson: Cpt Richard Gustin
    : Lt John G. Simpson: Cpt James H. Cooper
  • Bateria G, primul Pennsylvania Light: Cpt Frank P. Amsden: Cpt Dunbar R. Ransom

VI Corp Edit

    , Compania L: Lt George Vanderbilt
  • 6 Cavaleria Pennsylvania, Compania I: Cpt James Starr
  • 6 Cavaleria Pennsylvania, Compania K: Cpt Frederick C. Newhall
    : Ltc Mark W. Collet: Col Samuel L. Buck: Col Henry W. Brown: Col William B. Hatch (w), Ltc James N. Duffy: Ltc Edward L. Campbell: Col Henry O. Ryerson
    : Col George R. Myers: Ltc Leopold C. Newman: Col Francis E. Pinto: Ltc Elisha Hall
    : Cpt John W. Wolcott
  • Prima baterie (A), Massachusetts Light: Cpt William H. McCarthey: Cpt William Hexamer
  • Bateria D, 2 Statele Unite: Lt Edward B. Williston
  • 26 New Jersey: Col Andrew J. Morrison: Ltc Charles H. Joyce: Col Rasa N. Hyde: Col Charles B. Stoughton: Col Lewis A. Grant: Col Nathan Lord, Jr.


BG Francis L. Vinton (w)
Col Robert F. Taylor
BG Thomas H. Neill


Introducere

Această pagină oferă 3 relatări minunat detaliate ale celor 13 Voluntari din Massachusetts la bătălia de la Fredericksburg. Aceste povești erau indisponibile când am postat narațiunea originală în 2012. Colectiv, noul material prezentat aici oferă informații asociate cu 3 din cele 4 victime fatale suferite de regiment la bătălie. Ei sunt Charles Armstrong, C. J. Taylor și Edmond H. Kendall. (Informații despre a patra victimă, George E. Bigelow, sunt postate pe pagina „Sfârșitul anului” al acestui site). Cel mai cuprinzător detaliu aici, se găsește în Private Bourne Spooner & # 8217s memoir intitulat & # 8220In The Ranks. & # 8221 Mi-a fost trimis de Maxine Glenn, descendent direct al Private Spooner.

Maxine a transcris documentul din memoriile originale scrise de mână. Private Spooner își relatează experiențele pe linia de luptă cu detalii precise.

O a doua sursă nouă este povestea din revista Bivouac publicată în 1884, posibil scrisă de locotenentul Edward Rollins, Compania D, un veteran al regimentului și unul dintre cei 3 redactori ai revistei Bivouac. Această anecdotă povestește pe Edmond H. Kendall și o conversație nefastă cu prietenul său Gilbert H. Greenwood cu o zi înainte de luptă.

A treia nouă referință postată aici este un articol din ziarul din Worcester, Massachusetts, scris de un veteran al regimentului în 1870. El recreează drama emoțională trăită de bărbați pe măsură ce se apropia bătălia iminentă. Acest articol intitulat, & # 8220 Prima înfrângere la Fredericksburg & # 8221 deschide pagina.

Memoriile lui Sam Webster și John S. Fay găsite aici, au fost postate pe pagina originală Fredericksburg a acestui site în 2012, dar sunt relatări la fel de remarcabile despre regimentul în luptă. Fay descrie retragerea furtivă a Armatei Potomac, înapoi peste râul Rappahannock în siguranță. Un detașament de pichete din a 13-a masă sub comanda maiorului J. P. Gould s-a numărat printre ultimele trupe care au trecut din nou, încheind astfel campania generalului Burnside.

O notă despre fotografii

Această pagină este decorată cu imaginile fotografului Buddy Secor.

Buddy Secor din Fredericksburg mi-a acordat permisiunea de a-i folosi munca în trecut. Mai multe dintre imaginile sale pot fi vizualizate pe flickr sub pseudonimul „ninja pix”. Buddy își împrumută talentele către American Battlefield Trust. A luat Marele Premiu la concursul de fotografie al Trustului din 2012 și a ocupat locul 2 în 2010 la Festivalul Național de Cireșe din Washington, D.C.

Peisajele sale bântuitoare ale fermei Slaughter Pen, unde a luptat cea de-a 13-a Massachusetts, și portretele sale de soldați din apropiere [reconstituitori] adaugă foarte mult recreerii acestor evenimente dramatice și emoțiilor corespunzătoare evocate în narațiuni. Lucrarea transcende estetica acestei pagini.

Vedeți mai multe fotografii ale lui Buddy aici: Ninja Pix.

CREDITE PENTRU IMAGINI: Toate imaginile provin din colecția de imagini digitale ale Bibliotecii Congresului, cu următoarele excepții: Turcia în zbor din Wikimedia Commons Ilustrații Charles Reed din New York Public Library Digital Collections, [www.nypl.org] "The Federal Attack at the Slaughter Pen Farm "din Battles & amp Leaders of the Civil War, People's Pictoral Edition, Century Company, New York, 1894. Portretul Private Bourne Spooner din Frohne's Historic Military Auctions, Oshkosh, Wisconsin Imaginea generalului Nelson Taylor este din (acum dispărută) site-ul web „Generali și brevete”, http://www.generalsandbrevets.com/ngt/taylorn.htm Căpitanul Augustine Harlow, Co. D, este de la Centrul de educație al patrimoniului armatei, baza de date de imagini digitale, colecția Mass. MOLLUS. Imaginea Brushfire a fost găsit la dailygazette.com care însoțește articolul „Sezonul Brushfire a sosit cu o răzbunare.” de Peter R. Barber, 23 aprilie 2018 Caporalul George Henry Hill de la descendentul lui Hill, Carol Robbins, trimis de Alan Arno Ilustrația lui Frederic Remington a trei soldați care își examinau picioarele dureroase este din Civil War Times Illustrated. Fotografiile marcatorului câmpului de luptă pentru brigada lui Taylor au fost făcute de Susan Forbush, când am vizitat împreună câmpul de luptă în 2012 fotografiile lui Buddy Secor includ: Slaughter Pen Farm la Sunset, (două imagini), soldați în jurul focului de tabără și echipajul bateriei de alamă în acțiune. TOATE IMAGinile au fost EDITATE în PHOTOSHOP.


Hartă Harta bătăliei de la Chancellorsville, inclusiv operațiunile din 29 aprilie până pe 5 mai 1863.

Hărțile din materialele Map Collections au fost fie publicate înainte de 1922, produse de guvernul Statelor Unite, fie ambele (a se vedea înregistrările din catalog care însoțesc fiecare hartă pentru informații cu privire la data publicării și sursa). Biblioteca Congresului oferă acces la aceste materiale în scopuri educaționale și de cercetare și nu are cunoștință de nicio protecție a drepturilor de autor din SUA (a se vedea Titlul 17 din Codul Statelor Unite) sau de orice alte restricții din materialele Colecției Hărți.

Rețineți că este necesară permisiunea scrisă a proprietarilor drepturilor de autor și / sau a altor deținători de drepturi (cum ar fi drepturile de publicitate și / sau de confidențialitate) pentru distribuirea, reproducerea sau alte utilizări ale articolelor protejate dincolo de cea permisă de utilizarea corectă sau de alte derogări legale. Responsabilitatea de a face o evaluare juridică independentă a unui articol și de a asigura permisiunile necesare revine în cele din urmă persoanelor care doresc să utilizeze articolul.

Linie de credit: Biblioteca Congresului, Divizia Geografie și Hartă.


Bătălia de la Fredericksburg

La 13 decembrie 1862, generalul confederat Robert E. Lee și armata # Virginia din Nord respinge o serie de atacuri ale generalului Ambrose Burnside și Armata Potomacului la Fredericksburg, Virginia. Înfrângerea a fost una dintre cele mai decisive pierderi pentru armata Uniunii și a dat o lovitură gravă moralului nordic în iarna 1862-63.

Burnside a preluat comanda Armatei Potomacului în noiembrie 1862 după ce George McClellan nu a reușit să-l urmărească pe Lee în Virginia, după bătălia de la Antietam din Maryland, pe 17 septembrie. Burnside a elaborat imediat un plan pentru a se deplasa împotriva capitalei confederate la Richmond, Virginia. Acest lucru a cerut un marș rapid al federalilor de la pozițiile lor din nordul Virginiei până la Fredericksburg pe râul Rappahannock. Burnside a planificat să traverseze râul în acel punct și apoi să continue spre sud.

Campania a început promițător pentru Uniune. Armata s-a deplasat rapid pe Rappahannock, dar apoi s-a oprit peste râu din Fredericksburg. Din cauza executării slabe a ordinelor, un pod de ponton nu a fost în loc de câteva zile. Întârzierea i-a permis lui Lee să-și mute trupele în loc de-a lungul Marye & # x2019s Heights deasupra Fredericksburg. Confederații erau în siguranță pe un drum scufundat protejat de un zid de piatră, privind în jos pe pantele deschise care se întindeau de la marginea Fredericksburg. Poziția confederației a fost atât de puternică încât un ofițer rebel a afirmat că puiul # x201Ca nu ar putea trăi pe acel câmp atunci când deschidem pe el. & # X201D

Burnside a decis să atace oricum. Pe 13 decembrie, el a lansat 14 atacuri împotriva liniilor confederate. Deși artileria Uniunii a fost eficientă împotriva rebelilor, câmpul de 600 de curți a fost un teren de ucidere pentru yankiii care atacau. Niciun soldat al Uniunii nu a ajuns la zidul din vârful Marye & # x2019s Heights și puțini au ajuns chiar la 50 de metri de el. & # x201C Este bine că războiul este atât de oribil, altfel ar trebui să ne îndrăgostim prea mult de el. O noapte extrem de rece a înghețat mulți dintre Uniunea morți și răniți.


Bătălia de la Fredericksburg și numeroasele sale interpretări

Cea sută cincizeci și a treia aniversare a bătăliei de la Fredericksburg, purtată în perioada 11-15 decembrie 1862, ne oferă un memento important nu numai pentru costurile enorme ale războiului civil, ci și pentru realizările majore ale războiului și conservarea Uniunii și emanciparea sclavilor & # 8211 nu erau în niciun caz inevitabile. După înfrângerea confederaților la bătăliile de la Antietam, Perryville și Corint, forțele Uniunii în toamna anului 1862 și-au reînnoit ofensivele împotriva Richmond, Chattanooga și Vicksburg. Cu toate acestea, fiecare dintre aceste eforturi s-a dovedit dezamăgitor și costisitor. În statele din nord, disperarea și dezamăgirea au crescut. Pentru administrația Lincoln, situația politică a fost descurajantă, deoarece republicanii au suferit pierderi grave la alegerile din toamna anului 1862.

Ceea ce a însemnat un impas aparent în teatrul de est al războiului l-a determinat pe președintele Abraham Lincoln să îl înlocuiască pe generalul George B. McClellan cu generalul Ambrose E. Burnside în calitate de comandant al armatei Potomac în noiembrie 1862. Cu toate acestea, armata Potomac a rămas plină cu loialiștii lui McClellan, iar generalul Joseph Hooker a căutat în mod deschis pe primul loc. Burnside a înțeles clar că predecesorul său a fost înlăturat pentru că nu era suficient de agresiv și putea simți presiunea politică pentru a da o lovitură împotriva generalului confederat Robert E. Lee. Generalul Uniunii a propus să se îndrepte spre Fredericksburg, Virginia, preliminar unei ofensive împotriva lui Richmond. Burnside și-a făcut armata o uimitoare patruzeci de mile în două zile, lăsându-l pe Lee să ghicească intențiile Uniunii. Dar apoi ofensiva s-a împotmolit în timp ce jefuirea birocratică a întârziat sosirea pontoanelor necesare pentru trecerea la râul Rappahannock. Întârzierea i-a permis lui Lee să-și concentreze forțele și să stabilească poziții defensive puternice.

În dimineața zilei de 11 decembrie, inginerii lui Burnside au început în cele din urmă să pună poduri de ponton peste Rappahannock. Artileria Uniunii a bombardat confederații și o brigadă a Uniunii a trecut râul și a angajat inamicul. În cele din urmă, i-au alungat pe apărătorii confederați și # 8211, deși nu fără o mulțime de lupte de stradă, un eveniment rar din timpul războiului civil american. În următoarele câteva zile, soldații Uniunii au concediat cu atenție Fredericksburg.

La 13 decembrie, Burnside a ordonat generalului William B. Franklin să atace dreapta confederată. Nu a mers bine. Ordinele elaborate neglijent, confuzia cu privire la rețeaua rutieră și lipsa inițiativei lui Franklin au dus mai întâi la întârziere și apoi la un asalt slab efectuat în mare parte de o singură divizie. Între timp, crezând că Franklin a obținut un succes mult mai mare decât el, Burnside a ordonat atacuri împotriva confederației stânga pentru a-i alunga pe rebeli de pe Mayre’s Heights din spatele Fredericksburg. Focul de artilerie confederat bine plasat și ceea ce unii participanți au descris ca o „foaie de flacără” de la trupele staționate în spatele unui zid de piatră au aruncat înapoi toate aceste atacuri. Alte atacuri au continuat pentru restul zilei și soldații confederați i-au respins pe toți, provocând pierderi grele trupelor Uniunii. La căderea nopții, șaptesprezece brigăzi diferite ale Uniunii atacaseră stânga confederată. Sute de bărbați au rămas prinși pe câmp printre țipetele tovarășilor lor răniți și pe moarte.

Câțiva generali au fost nevoiți să-l scoată pe Burnside în afara conducerii iubitului său Corp al IX-lea într-un atac disperat a doua zi, dar până la 16 decembrie, a retras Armata Potomacului de la Fredericksburg. La rândul său, Lee așteptase cu răbdare, așteptând un nou atac al Uniunii. El a fost furios că yankiii au scăpat și a fost frustrat de ceea ce el și Stonewall Jackson ar considera ulterior o victorie incompletă, dacă nu chiar goală.

Deși bătălia îi costase confederaților peste 5000 de victime, federalii pierduseră aproape 13.000 de oameni. Armistițiile pentru înmormântare, mormintele comune, spitalele de campanie improvizate și operația efectuată la lumina lumânărilor ar însemna că priveliștile, sunetele și mirosurile bătăliei ar rămâne gravate în mintea soldaților de ambele părți pentru anii următori. Listele lungi de morți și răniți (adesea incomplete și inexacte) au umplut în scurt timp coloane de ziar.

Știrile despre bătălie au ajuns rapid și deseori inexact prin telegraf. Lui Horace Greeley New York Tribune a susținut în mod sălbatic că Burnside l-a „generalizat” pe Lee în retragerea armatei sale din Fredericksburg, un editorial în ziua de Crăciun a adăugat că, în afară de pierderile, s-a pierdut puțin la Fredericksburg. A rămas pentru TribunăRivalul amar, New York Herald, pentru a afirma evidentul, deși nu fără o bucurie: „În acest timp de Crăciun, când zânele bune umple aerul, cu greu ne putem întreba de miracolul brusc care ne-a arătat afacerea Fredericksburg în adevărata sa lumină și ne-a dat ocazie pentru bucurie națională în loc de tristețe națională ”. Senatorii republicani restabili s-au mutat pentru a scăpa de secretarul de stat al lui William H. Seward, pe care l-au văzut ca geniul malefic care împiedică guvernul să dea curs războiului cu succes, deși Lincoln a reușit să facă față cu criză a cabinetului care a urmat. The Times din Londra a prevăzut căderea iminentă a republicii americane. O creștere puternică a prețurilor aurului (echivalentul acelei epoci cu media industrială Dow Jones) a reflectat întunericul de la Fredericksburg. Au existat speculații considerabile și # 8211, inclusiv de la aboliționiștii Harriet Beecher Stowe și Frederick Douglass & # 8211, că Lincoln ar putea întârzia chiar emiterea Proclamației finale de emancipare.

Nou îndrăzneți, „Copperhead”, democrații pentru pace s-au alăturat unor cuvinte precum „sacrificare” și „măcelărie”. Soldații din armata Potomac și oamenii din nord și-au pierdut, în general, încrederea în cauză, au căutat oameni vinovați pentru pierderea devastatoare de la Fredericksburg și au înveselit zvonurile de mediere străină care au început din nou să circule. Vina pentru dezastru a căzut pe Burnside, sau pe generalul-șef Henry W. Halleck, sau pe secretarul de război Edwin M. Stanton, sau pe Lincoln au fost chiar apeluri pentru a-l readuce pe McClellan. Burnside și-a asumat întreaga responsabilitate pentru eșecul de la Fredericksburg, deși Lincoln a emis o scrisoare bizară sugerând că eșecul a fost în mare parte „un accident” și a felicitat armata că victimele au fost „comparativ atât de mici”. Moralul din Armata Potomacului a atins noi minime și a urmat un val de dezertări.

Cu toate acestea, în cele din urmă, acea mult luptată forță de luptă s-a dovedit remarcabil de rezistentă. Un locotenent a recunoscut că unii dintre bărbați ar fi putut „blestema stelele și dungile” imediat după luptă, dar „aceiași soldați se vor lupta ca niște câini de taur atunci când vine vorba de zgârieturi”. Într-adevăr, veteranii mormăiți ar putea fi „mizați mai mult”. Cea mai rapidă modalitate de a pune capăt războiului, credea acest soldat, a fost să le oferi Rebsului o biciuire bună și să-i tacă pe „gâfâi” de acasă. Între timp, pentru confederați, o victorie relativ ușoară a produs o periculoasă încredere. În multe privințe, Fredericksburg a fost un punct scăzut înșelător în averile federale și un punct la fel de înșelător pentru confederați.

Oricare ar fi deznădejdea, confuzia și gândirea dorită, puțini contemporani s-au îndoit de semnificația bătăliei. Clara Barton s-a îndreptat spre sud pentru a o ajuta pe rănita Louisa May Alcott a mers să lucreze ca asistentă medicală într-un spital din Washington. Walt Whitman a călătorit la Falmouth pentru a avea grijă de fratele său rănit, Herman Melville, care a scris o poezie. La Londra, Karl Marx a fumegat din cauza incompetenței militare, iar Henry Adams și-a făcut curajul să facă față unui alt dezastru al Uniunii. Într-un fel, războiul și chiar această bătălie au contat pentru toată lumea & # 8211 de la frenologul care oferise o lectură ridicolă și prostească a personajului lui Burnside editorului ferm al American științific care a dat vina pe politicieni și generali pentru necazurile națiunii.

Războiul va dura aproape doi ani și jumătate. Și într-o lume în care, în cuvintele apostolului Pavel, de multe ori „vedem printr-un pahar întunecat”, bătălia de la Fredericksburg ar putea servi drept amintire sănătoasă atât a punctelor noastre forte umane, cât și, mai important, a tuturor noastre- limitările umane.


Câmpurile de luptă ale războiului civil american: atunci și acum

Războiul care a schimbat peisajul social american pentru totdeauna l-a afectat și pe cel fizic. Revizuiește unele dintre cele mai faimoase câmpuri de luptă din istoria războiului civil american și cum arată astăzi.

Little Round Top este unul dintre cele mai proeminente două dealuri de la sud de Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. În a doua zi a bătăliei de acolo, în 1863, dealul a devenit un punct focal în atacurile flancului lui Robert E. Lee împotriva trupelor Uniunii. Generalul maior Gouverneur K. Warren, inginerul șef al armatei Potomac, și-a repezit trupele Uniunii în vârful dealului, câștigând terenul ridicat împotriva confederaților în timp. Lupta pentru Little Round Top a fost incredibil de acerbă, cu un glonț care l-a lovit în mod fatal pe colonelul Uniunii Strong Vincent în timpul primei contra-volei confederate. Ultimele sale cuvinte ar fi fost „Nu da un centimetru”. Tăietorii sudici au reușit să aleagă mai mulți ofițeri de rang înalt ai Uniunii, în încercarea de a arunca apărarea Little Round Top în haos. Dar trupele Uniunii au reușit să omoare mai mult de două ori mai mulți confederați decât s-au pierdut din propriile lor rânduri.

Chancellorsville

După o dezmembrare a Uniunii în bătălia de la Fredericksburg, Sudul a fost pregătit pentru succes simultan sub forma „celei mai mari victorii a lui Lee” și a înfrângerii sub forma dispariției omului pe care mulți l-au considerat pe cel mai bun general al Confederației, Stonewall Jackson. Ambele evenimente au avut loc la bătălia de la Chancellorsville. În număr mai mare de două la unu, armata lui Lee din Virginia de Nord l-a înfruntat pe Joseph Hooker și ceea ce el a numit „cea mai bună armată de pe planetă”. Încrederea lui Hooker în această armată sa dovedit a fi căderea sa la Chancellorsville. În timp ce Hooker s-a oprit pentru a aștepta întăriri, Stonewall Jackson și mdashfamous pentru promisiunea sa de la Fredericksburg de a „ucide fiecare ultim om” și mdashtook a luat inițiativa, lansând un atac, în ciuda faptului că a fost mult mai numeros. Acțiunile sale au dictat evenimentele bătăliei de la Chancellorsville, deoarece au forțat armata lui Hooker să lupte în condiții confederate. În timpul uneia dintre numeroasele sale acuzații împotriva liniilor Union, Jackson a pierdut un braț și mai târziu a murit din cauza rănilor sale. Sudul își pierduse cel mai zelos comandant.

Chickamauga

Numai Gettysburg a avut ca rezultat mai multe victime. Cea mai sângeroasă bătălie a Războiului Civil disputată în sud, în perioada 18-20 septembrie 1863, 34.000 de americani au pierdut viața sau membrele la Chickamauga.

Bull Run & fraslFirst Manassas

Prima mare luptă terestră purtată în Virginia, Bull Run a văzut angajarea a peste 60.000 de soldați. Luptele acerbe ale colonelului Thomas Jackson de la Henry House Hill i-au adus porecla de „Stonewall”. O sarcină târzie de cavalerie a colonelului confederat Jeb Brown a făcut ca forțele Uniunii să se învârtă. Focul de artilerie confederat a pus retragerea deja haotică și mai departe pe drumul către pandemoniu. Totuși, cel mai rău lucru pentru retragerea Uniunii a fost mulțimea de spectatori care veniseră de la Washington pentru a vedea spectacolul.

Fredericksburg

La doar două zile după ce a preluat comanda Armatei Potomacului de la excesivul George McClellan, generalul Ambrose Burnside a abandonat ritmul lent al predecesorului său în favoarea unui sprint complet către Fredericksburg, unde o campanie de succes ar întrerupe aprovizionările confederate din Richmond și ușurează trecerea proviziilor Uniunii de la Washington într-o singură mișcare. Robert E. Lee își împărțise armata din Virginia de Nord, deoarece McClellan a refuzat să atace Fredericksburg, lăsând flancurile neprotejate și orașul vulnerabil. Dar înainte ca Burnside să poată asedia orașul, el a trebuit mai întâi să vadă râul Rappahannock. Vremea rea ​​și o birocrație ineficientă au însemnat că până la sosirea echipamentului de ponton necesar pentru armata lui Burnside, au sosit întăriri pentru Lee. Deoarece planul lui Burnside depindea de o trecere lină, fără opoziții, a râului, forțele Uniunii erau condamnate înainte de începerea bătăliei. La sfârșitul acestuia, 17929 de victime fuseseră înregistrate.

Acest articol apare în Newsweeknoua carte, "Lincoln: 150 de ani mai târziu," de editorul de probleme Tim Baker de la Topix Media Lab.


Luptă

Trecerea Rappahannock, 11 decembrie și # 821112

Inginerii Uniunii au început să asambleze șase poduri de ponton înainte de zori în 11 decembrie, două chiar la nord de centrul orașului, un al treilea la capătul sudic al orașului și trei mai la sud, lângă confluența Rappahannock și Deep Run. Inginerii care construiau podul direct vizavi de oraș au fost supuși focului pedepsitor al ascuțitorilor confederați, în primul rând de la brigada din Brig din Mississippi. Gen. William Barksdale, comandant al apărării orașului. Artileria Uniunii a încercat să dea afară trăgătorii, dar pozițiile lor în pivnițele caselor au făcut ca focul din 150 de tunuri să fie ineficient. În cele din urmă, comandantul de artilerie al lui Burnside, Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, l-a convins să trimită grupuri de aterizare de infanterie în barci cu ponton pentru a asigura un mic cap de plajă și a direcționa ascuțitorii. Col. Norman J. Hall și-a oferit voluntar brigada pentru această misiune. Burnside a devenit brusc reticent, lamentându-se către Hall în fața oamenilor săi că „efortul însemna moarte pentru majoritatea celor care ar trebui să întreprindă călătoria”. Când oamenii săi au răspuns la cererea lui Hall cu trei urale, Burnside a cedat. La ora 15:00, artileria Uniunii a început un bombardament pregătitor și 135 de infanteriști din Michigan 7 și Massachusetts 19 s-au înghesuit în bărcile mici. Au traversat cu succes și s-au întins într-o linie de luptă pentru a îndepărta ascuțitorii. Deși unii dintre confederați s-au predat, luptele au continuat stradă cu stradă prin oraș, pe măsură ce inginerii au terminat podurile. Marea divizie dreaptă a lui Sumner a început să treacă la ora 16:30, dar cea mai mare parte a oamenilor săi nu au trecut până la 12 decembrie. Marea divizie a centrului Hooker a traversat pe 13 decembrie, folosind atât podurile nordice, cât și cele sudice.

Îndepărtarea clădirilor orașului de infanteria lui Sumner și de focul de artilerie de dincolo de râu a început prima mare luptă urbană a războiului. Pistolarii Uniunii au trimis peste 5.000 de obuze împotriva orașului și a crestelor spre vest. La căderea nopții, patru brigăzi de trupe ale Uniunii au ocupat orașul, pe care l-au jefuit cu o furie care nu fusese văzută în război până în acel moment. Acest comportament l-a înfuriat pe Lee, care și-a comparat depredările cu cele ale vechilor vandali. Distrugerea a supărat și trupele confederate, dintre care mulți erau nativi virginieni. Mulți din partea Uniunii au fost, de asemenea, șocați de distrugerea cauzată Fredericksburg. Victimele civile au fost neobișnuit de rare în mijlocul unei violențe atât de răspândite George Rable estimează nu mai mult de patru decese civile.

River crossings south of the city by Franklin's Left Grand Division were much less eventful. Both bridges were completed by 11 a.m. on December 11 while five batteries of Union artillery suppressed most sniper fire against the engineers. Franklin was ordered at 4 p.m. to cross his entire command, but only a single brigade was sent out before dark. Crossings resumed at dawn and were completed by 1 p.m. on December 12. Early on December 13, Jackson recalled his divisions under Jubal Early and D.H. Hill from down river positions to join his main defensive lines south of the city.

Burnside's verbal instructions on December 12 outlined a main attack by Franklin, supported by Hooker, on the southern flank, while Sumner made a secondary attack on the northern. His actual orders on December 13 were vague and confusing to his subordinates. La 5 p.m. on December 12, he made a cursory inspection of the southern flank, where Franklin and his subordinates pressed him to give definite orders for a morning attack by the grand division, so they would have adequate time to position their forces overnight. However, Burnside demurred and the order did not reach Franklin until 7:15 or 7:45 a.m. When it arrived, it was not as Franklin expected. Rather than ordering an attack by the entire grand division of almost 60,000 men, Franklin was to keep his men in position, but was to send "a division at least" to seize the high ground (Prospect Hill) around Hamilton's Crossing, Sumner was to send one division through the city and up Telegraph Road, and both flanks were to be prepared to commit their entire commands. Burnside was apparently expecting these weak attacks to intimidate Lee, causing him to withdraw. Unfortunately, Franklin, who had originally advocated a vigorous assault, chose to interpret Burnside's order very conservatively. Brig. Gen. James A. Hardie, who delivered the order, did not ensure that Burnside's intentions were understood by Franklin, and map inaccuracies about the road network made those intentions unclear. Furthermore, Burnside's choice of the verb "to seize" was less forceful in 19th century military terminology than an order "to carry" the heights.

South of the city, December 13

Franklin ordered his I Corps commander, Maj. Gen. John F. Reynolds, to select a division for the attack. Reynolds chose his smallest division, about 4,500 men commanded by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade , and assigned Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's division to support Meade's attack. His reserve division, under Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday, was to face south and protect the left flank between the Richmond Road and the river. Meade's division began moving out 8:30 a.m. in a dense morning fog, which would not begin to lift until 10 a.m., with Gibbon's division following on its right rear. They moved parallel to the river initially, turning right to face the Richmond Road, where they began to be struck by enfilading fire from the Virginia Horse Artillery under Major John Pelham. Pelham started with two cannons—a 12-pounder Napoleon smoothbore and a rifled Blakely—but continued with only one after the latter was disabled by counter-battery fire. "Jeb" Stuart sent word to Pelham that he should feel free to withdraw from his dangerous position at any time, to which Pelham responded, "Tell the General I can hold my ground." The Iron Brigade (formerly Gibbon's command, but now led by Brig. Gen. Solomon Meredith) was sent out to deal with the Confederate horse artillery. This action was mainly conducted by the 24th Michigan Infantry , a newly enlisted regiment that had joined the brigade in October. After about an hour, Pelham's ammunition began to run low and he withdrew. General Lee observed the action and commented about Pelham, age 24, "It is glorious to see such courage in one so young." The most prominent victim of Pelham's fire was Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, a cavalry general mortally wounded by a shell while standing in reserve near Franklin's headquarters. Jackson's main artillery batteries had remained silent in the fog during this exchange, but the Union troops soon began to receive direct fire from Prospect Hill, principally five batteries directed by Lt. Col. Reuben Lindsay Walker, and Meade's attack was stalled about 600 yards from his initial objective for almost two hours by these combined artillery attacks.

The Union artillery fire was lifted as Meade's men moved forward around 1 p.m. Jackson's force of about 35,000 remained concealed on the wooded ridge to Meade's front. His formidable defensive line had an unforeseen flaw. In A.P. Hill's division's line, a triangular patch of the woods that extended beyond the railroad was swampy and covered with thick underbrush and the Confederates had left a 600-yard gap there between the brigades of Brig. Gens. James H. Lane and James J. Archer. Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's brigade stood about a quarter mile behind the gap. Meade's 1st Brigade (Col. William Sinclair) entered the gap, climbed the railroad embankment, and turned right into the underbrush, striking Lane's brigade in the flank. Following immediately behind, his 3rd Brigade (Brig. Gen. Feger Jackson) turned left and hit Archer's flank. The 2nd Brigade (Col. Albert L. Magilton) came up in support and intermixed with the leading brigades. As the gap widened with pressure on the flanks, thousands of Meade's men reached the top of the ridge and ran into Gregg's brigade. Many of these Confederates had stacked arms while taking cover from Union artillery and were not expecting to be attacked at that moment, so were killed or captured unarmed. Gregg at first mistook the Union soldiers for fleeing Confederate troops and ordered his men not to fire on them. While he rode prominently in front of his lines, the partially deaf Gregg could not hear the approaching Federals or their bullets flying around him. He was shot through the spinal cord, dying two days later.

Confederate reserves—the divisions of Brig. Gens. Jubal A. Early and William B. Taliaferro—moved into the fray from behind Gregg's original position. Inspired by their attack, regiments from Lane's and Archer's brigades rallied and formed a new defensive line in the gap. Now Meade's men were receiving fire from three sides and could not withstand the pressure. Feger Jackson attempted to flank a Confederate battery, but after his horse was shot and he began to lead on foot, he was shot in the head by a volley and his brigade fell back, leaderless (Col. Joseph W. Fisher soon replaced Jackson in command).

To Meade's right, Gibbon's division prepared to move forward at 1 p.m. Brig. Gen. Nelson Taylor proposed to Gibbon that they supplement Meade's assault with a bayonet charge against Lane's position. However, Gibbon stated that this would violate his orders, so Taylor's brigade did not move forward until 1:30 p.m. The attack did not have the benefit of a gap to exploit, nor did the Union soldiers have any wooded cover for their advance, so progress was slow under heavy fire from Lane's brigade and Confederate artillery. Immediately following Taylor was the brigade of Col. Peter Lyle, and the advance of the two brigades ground to a halt before they reached the railroad. Committing his reserve at 1:45 p.m., Gibbon sent forward his brigade under Col. Adrian R. Root, which moved through the survivors of the first two brigades, but they were soon brought to a halt as well. Eventually some of the Federals reached the crest of the ridge and had some success during hand-to-hand fighting—men on both sides had depleted their ammunition and resorted to bayonets and rifle butts, and even empty rifles with bayonets thrown like javelins—but they were forced to withdraw back across the railroad embankment along with Meade's men to their left. Gibbon's attack, despite heavy casualties, had failed to support Meade's temporary breakthrough.

My God, General Reynolds, did they think my division could whip Lee's whole army?

After the battle Meade complained that some of Gibbon's officers had not charged quickly enough. But his primary frustration was with Brig. Gen. David B. Birney, whose division of the III Corps had been designated to support the attack as well. Birney claimed that his men had been subjected to damaging artillery fire as they formed up, that he had not understood the importance of Meade's attack, and that Reynolds had not ordered his division forward. When Meade galloped to the rear to confront Birney with a string of fierce profanities that, in the words of one staff lieutenant, "almost makes the stones creep," he was finally able to order the brigadier forward under his own responsibility, but harbored resentment for weeks. By this time, however, it was too late to accomplish any further offensive action.

Early's division began a counterattack, led initially by Col. Edmund N. Atkinson's Georgia brigade, which inspired the men from the brigades of Col. Robert Hoke, Brig. Gen. James J. Archer, and Col. John M. Brockenbrough to charge forward out of the railroad ditches, driving Meade's men from the woods in a disorderly retreat, followed closely by Gibbon's. Early's orders to his brigades were to pursue as far as the railroad, but in the chaos many kept up the pressure over the open fields as far as the old Richmond Road, where they were easier targets for Union artillery fire. The Confederates were also struck by the leading brigade of Birney's belated advance, commanded by Brig. Gen. J. H. Hobart Ward. Birney followed up with the brigades of Brig. Gens. Hiram G. Berry and John C. Robinson, which broke the Rebel advance that had threatened to drive the Union into the river. Any further Confederate advance was deterred by the arrival of the III Corps division of Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles on the right. General Burnside, who by this time was focused on his attacks on Marye's Heights, was dismayed that his left flank attack had not achieved the success he assumed earlier in the day. He ordered Franklin to "advance his right and front," but despite repeated entreaties, Franklin refused, claiming that all of his forces had been engaged. This was not true, however, as the entire VI Corps and Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday's division of the I Corps had been mostly idle, suffering only a few casualties from artillery fire while they waited in reserve.

It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it.

The Confederates withdrew back to the safety of the hills south of town. Stonewall Jackson considered mounting a resumed counterattack, but the Federal artillery and impending darkness changed his mind. A fortuitous Union breakthrough had been wasted because Franklin did not reinforce Meade's success with some of the 20,000 men standing in reserve. Neither Franklin nor Reynolds took any personal involvement in the battle, and were unavailable to their subordinates at the critical point. Franklin's losses were about 5,000 casualties in comparison to Stonewall Jackson's 3,400, demonstrating the ferocity of the fighting. Skirmishing and artillery duels continued until dark, but no additional major attacks took place, while the center of the battle moved north to Marye's Heights.

Marye's Heights, December 13

On the northern end of the battlefield, Brig. Gen. William H. French's division of the II Corps prepared to move forward, subjected to Confederate artillery fire that was descending on the fog-covered city of Fredericksburg. General Burnside's orders to Maj. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner , commander of the Right Grand Division, was to send "a division or more" to seize the high ground to the west of the city, assuming that his assault on the southern end of the Confederate line would be the decisive action of the battle. The avenue of approach was difficult—mostly open fields, but interrupted by scattered houses, fences, and gardens that would restrict the movement of battle lines. A canal stood about 200 yards west of the town, crossed by three narrow bridges, which would require the Union troops to funnel themselves into columns before proceeding. About 600 yards to the west of Fredericksburg was the low ridge known as Marye's Heights, rising 40󈞞 feet above the plain. (Although popularly known as Marye's Heights, the ridge was composed of several hills separated by ravines, from north to south: Taylor's Hill, Stansbury Hill, Marye's Hill, and Willis Hill.) Near the crest of the portion of the ridge comprising Marye's Hill and Willis Hill, a narrow lane in a slight cut—the Telegraph Road, known after the battle as the Sunken Road—was protected by a 4-foot stone wall, enhanced in places with log breastworks and abatis, making it a perfect infantry defensive position. Confederate Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws initially had about 2,000 men on the front line of Marye's Heights and there were an additional 7,000 men in reserve on the crest and behind the ridge. Massed artillery provided almost uninterrupted coverage of the plain below. General Longstreet had been assured by his artillery commander, Lt. Col. Edward Porter Alexander, "General, we cover that ground now so well that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth comb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it."

The fog lifted from the town around 10 a.m. and Sumner gave his order to advance an hour later. French's brigade under Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball began to move around noon. They advanced slowly through heavy artillery fire, crossed the canal in columns over the narrow bridges, and formed in line, with fixed bayonets, behind the protection of a shallow bluff. In perfect line of battle, they advanced up the muddy slope until they were cut down at about 125 yards from the stone wall by repeated rifle volleys. Some soldiers were able to get as close as 40 yards, but having suffered severe casualties from both the artillery and infantry fire, the survivors clung to the ground. Kimball was severely wounded during the assault, and his brigade suffered 25% casualties. French's brigades under Col. John W. Andrews and Col. Oliver H. Palmer followed, with casualty rates of almost 50%.

Sumner's original order called for the division of Brig. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock to support French and Hancock sent forward his brigade under Col. Samuel K. Zook behind Palmer's. They met a similar fate. Next was his Irish Brigade under Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher . By coincidence, they attacked the area defended by fellow Irishmen of Col. Robert McMillan's 24th Georgia Infantry. One Confederate who spotted the green regimental flags approaching cried out, "Oh God, what a pity! Here comes Meagher's fellows." But McMillan exhorted his troops: "Give it to them now, boys! Now's the time! Give it to them!" Hancock's final brigade was led by Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell. Leading his two regiments on the left, Col. Nelson A. Miles suggested to Caldwell that the practice of marching in formation, firing, and stopping to reload, made the Union soldiers easy targets, and that a concerted bayonet charge might be effective in carrying the works. Caldwell denied permission. Miles was struck by a bullet in the throat as he led his men to within 40 yards of the wall, where they were pinned down as their predecessors had been. Caldwell himself was soon struck by two bullets and put out of action.

The commander of the II Corps, Maj. Gen. Darius N. Couch, was dismayed at the carnage wrought upon his two divisions in the hour of fighting and, like Col. Miles, realized that the tactics were not working. He first considered a massive bayonet charge to overwhelm the defenders, but as he surveyed the front, he quickly realized that French's and Hancock's divisions were in no shape to move forward again. He next planned for his final division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, to swing to the right and attempt to envelop the Confederate left, but upon receiving urgent requests for help from French and Hancock, he sent Howard's men over and around the fallen troops instead. The brigade of Col. Joshua Owen went in first, reinforced by Col. Norman J. Hall's brigade, and then two regiments of Brig. Gen. Alfred Sully's brigade. The other corps in Sumner's grand division was the IX Corps, and he sent in one of its divisions under Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis . After two hours of desperate fighting, four Union divisions had failed in the mission Burnside had originally assigned to one. Casualties were heavy: II Corps losses for the afternoon were 4,114, Sturgis's division 1,011.

While the Union Army paused, Longstreet reinforced his line so that there were four ranks of infantrymen behind the stone wall. Brig. Gen. Thomas R. R. Cobb of Georgia, who had commanded the key sector of the line, was mortally wounded by a sniper's bullet and was replaced by Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw. General Lee expressed concerns to Longstreet about the massing troops breaking his line, but Longstreet assured his commander, "General, if you put every man on the other side of the Potomac on that field to approach me over the same line, and give me plenty of ammunition, I will kill them all before they reach my line."

By midafternoon, Burnside had failed on both flanks to make progress against the Confederates. Rather than reconsidering his approach in the face of heavy casualties, he stubbornly decided to continue on the same path. He sent orders to Franklin to renew the assault on the left (which, as described earlier, the Left Grand Division commander ignored) and ordered his Center Grand Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, to cross the Rappahannock into Fredericksburg and continue the attack on Marye's Heights. Hooker performed a personal reconnaissance (something that neither Burnside nor Sumner had done, both remaining east of the river during the failed assaults) and returned to Burnside's headquarters to advise against the attack.

Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield, commanding Hooker's V Corps, while waiting for Hooker to return from his conference with Burnside, sent his division under Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin to relieve Sturgis's men. By this time, Maj. Gen. George Pickett's Confederate division and one of Maj. Gen. John Bell Hood's brigades had marched north to reinforce Marye's Heights. Griffin smashed his three brigades against the Confederate position, one by one. Also concerned about Sturgis, Couch sent the six guns of Capt. John G. Hazard's Battery B, 1st Rhode Island Light Artillery, to within 150 yards of the Confederate line. They were hit hard by Confederate sharpshooter and artillery fire and provided no effective relief to Sturgis.

A soldier in Hancock's division reported movement in the Confederate line that led some to believe that the enemy might be retreating. Despite the unlikeliness of this supposition, the V Corps division of Brig. Gen. Andrew A. Humphreys was ordered to attack and capitalize on the situation. Humphreys led his first brigade on horseback, with his men moving over and around fallen troops with fixed bayonets and unloaded rifles some of the fallen men clutched at the passing pant legs, urging their comrades not to go forward, causing the brigade to become disorganized in their advance. The charge reached to within 50 yards before being cut down by concentrated rifle fire. Brig. Gen. George Sykes was ordered to move forward with his V Corps regular army division to support Humphreys's retreat, but his men were caught in a crossfire and pinned down.

By 4 p.m., Hooker had returned from his meeting with Burnside, having failed to convince the commanding general to abandon the attacks. While Humphreys was still attacking, Hooker reluctantly ordered the IX Corps division of Brig. Gen. George W. Getty to attack as well, but this time to the leftmost portion of Marye's Heights, Willis Hill. Col. Rush Hawkins's brigade, followed by Col. Edward Harland's brigade, moved along an unfinished railroad line just north of Hazel Run, approaching close to the Confederate line without detection in the gathering twilight, but they were eventually detected, fired on, and repulsed.

Seven Union divisions had been sent in, generally one brigade at a time, for a total of fourteen individual charges, all of which failed, costing them from 6,000 to 8,000 casualties. Confederate losses at Marye's Heights totaled around 1,200. The falling of darkness and the pleas of Burnside's subordinates were enough to put an end to the attacks. Longstreet later wrote, "The charges had been desperate and bloody, but utterly hopeless." Thousands of Union soldiers spent the cold December night on the fields leading to the heights, unable to move or assist the wounded because of Confederate fire. That night, Burnside attempted to blame his subordinates for the disastrous attacks, but they argued that it was entirely his fault and no one else's.

Lull and withdrawal, December 14󈝻

During a dinner meeting the evening of December 13, Burnside dramatically announced that he would personally lead his old IX Corps in one final attack on Marye's Heights, but his generals talked him out of it the following morning. The armies remained in position throughout the day on December 14. That afternoon, Burnside asked Lee for a truce to attend to his wounded, which the latter graciously granted. The next day the Federal forces retreated across the river, and the campaign came to an end.

Testament to the extent of the carnage and suffering during the battle was the story of Richard Rowland Kirkland, a Confederate Army sergeant with Company G, 2nd South Carolina Volunteer Infantry. Stationed at the stone wall by the sunken road below Marye's Heights, Kirkland had a close up view to the suffering and like so many others was appalled at the cries for help of the Union wounded throughout the cold winter night of December 13, 1862. After obtaining permission from his commander, Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw, Kirkland gathered canteens and in broad daylight, without the benefit of a cease fire or a flag of truce (refused by Kershaw), provided water to numerous Union wounded lying on the field of battle. Union soldiers held their fire as it was obvious what Kirkland's intent was. Kirkland was nicknamed the " Angel of Marye's Heights " for these actions, and is memorialized with a statue by Felix de Weldon on the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park where he carried out his actions.


Battle of Fredericksburg (December 11 - 15, 1862)

Prelude
After the bloody Battle of Antietam (September 17, 1862) Confederate General Robert E. Lee was forced to retreat back into Virginia, ending his first invasion of the North. The commander of the Army of the Potomac, Major General George McClellan chose not to pursue Lee's retreating Army of Northern Virginia, prompting President Abraham Lincoln to issue an executive order on November 5, 1862, replacing McClellan with Major General Ambrose E. Burnside.

Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck urged Burnside to launch an invasion of Virginia quickly. Burnside submitted a plan to Halleck on November 9 that called for the Army of the Potomac to cross the Rappahannock River at the town of Fredericksburg and seize control of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, which would be used for a rapid invasion of the Confederate capital at Richmond. Halleck and Lincoln approved the plan and by November 19, 1862, the 115,000-man Army of the Potomac was positioned to cross the Rappahannock at Stafford Heights across from Fredericksburg.

Burnside's plans began unraveling as he was forced to wait until November 25 for the arrival of pontoons his engineers would use to build temporary bridges spanning the river. Lee used the delay to move his army from Culpeper, Virginia, and fortify the area in and around Fredericksburg. Unable to find suitable alternative sites to cross the Rappahannock, and feeling pressured by Lincoln and Halleck, Burnside decided to continue the operation and assault Lee's well-entrenched, 78,000-man Army of Northern Virginia head on.

December 11, 1862
Concealed by early-morning fog on December 11, Union engineers began constructing three pontoon bridges across the river—two directly opposite Fredericksburg and one a mile downstream. As the Yankees hastened to complete their task, the fog lifted, exposing them to the watchful eyes of Confederates on the other side. Sharpshooters from Brigadier General William Barksdale's Mississippian brigade who occupied the town soon sent the engineers scurrying for cover.

Burnside countered by ordering his chief of artillery, Brigadier General Henry Hunt, to shower Fredericksburg with a massive bombardment beginning at 12:30 pm. Despite a barrage of more than 8,000 shells that ravaged the city's homes and commercial establishments, Barksdale's sharpshooters re-emerged after the bombardment ended, to continue their deadly assault on Burnside's engineers as they attempted to resume their construction.

As completing the bridges became impracticable, Hunt suggested sending infantry task forces across the river by boat to establish beachheads from which to begin operations and silence the Rebel sharpshooters. At 3:30 that afternoon, men from the 7th Michigan, 89th New York, and 19th Massachusetts clambered aboard small boats and crossed the Rappahannock under heavy fire and executed the first large-scale opposed river crossing in American history.

After establishing their bridgeheads, the Union infantrymen moved into town where they engaged in close-quarter urban combat with Barksdale's brigade for nearly four hours. Gradually, the Yankees cleared the buildings and drove the Rebels out of town, enabling Burnside's engineers to complete the bridges by 5 p.m.

December 12, 1862
With the bridges completed, thousands of Federal soldiers poured into Fredericksburg and began plundering the town. As the drunken Yankees looted and burned civilian homes and businesses, enraged Confederates continued fortifying their defenses on the heights above the town.

December 13, 1862
Action at Prospect Hill and the Slaughter Field
After re-establishing control of his army, on December 13, Burnside began his assault on Lee's army. The initial point of attack would be against Lee's right flank on the southern end of the battlefield at Prospect Hill. Burnside selected Major General William B. Franklin's Grand Division to lead the offensive. Their orders were to advance across a farm field, later known as the "Slaughter Pen," and drive Lieutenant General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson's 2nd Corps from the woods on the other side.

Franklin had about 65,000 men at his disposal, but due to poorly worded orders from Burnside that morning, Franklin believed that he was to utilize only a small portion of his forces during the initial strike. Franklin selected two small divisions, totaling about 8,000 soldiers, from Major General John F. Reynolds' 1st Corps, to lead the onslaught against Jackson's 37,000 Confederate defenders. Reynolds' 3rd Division, commanded by Major General George Meade (future leader of the Army of the Potomac at the Battle of Gettysburg) would spearhead the attack. Meade's men would be supported on their right by Reynolds' 2nd Division, commanded by Brigadier General John Gibbon (former leader of the famous Iron Brigade).

As the Federals prepared to advance across the field, a single cannon on their left flank, manned by Major John Pelham of the Stewart Force Artillery, pinned them down for over an hour. It was not until Pelham ran out of ammunition that Union artillerists were able to move forward at 11:20 a.m. and shell Jackson's defenses for roughly forty minutes.

Assuming that the Union barrage had softened the Confederate lines, Meade and Gibbon finally moved forward around noon. As they advanced, the Yankees soon became disorganized when they were forced to cross a water-filled ditch fence. Adding to their plight, the Federals soon discovered that their artillerists had done little damage to the Rebel batteries in front of them. As the Bluecoats approached the Confederate lines, Jackson ordered his men to hold their fire until they came within about 800 yards. Upon entering this killing zone, Confederate artillerists unleashed a blistering fusillade that forced their victims to save themselves by lying prone in the cold December mud. Meade and Gibbon countered by signaling for their artillerists to resume firing on the Rebel batteries. For the next half hour or so, the gunners on both sides engaged in an artillery duel while the Union foot soldiers were pinned down.

Around 1 p.m., Meade ordered his men to rise and advance once again. Within the hour they maneuvered their way through an undefended swampy area. Two Union regiments broke through the Confederate line and crossed the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad tracks running through the area, surprising General Maxcy Gregg's Brigade who were resting in reserve with their arms stacked. During the subsequent melee, a Union bullet mortally wounded Gregg.

Despite the breakthrough, Meade's success quickly unraveled when three of his brigade commanders were wounded or killed. Ignoring Jackson's earlier instructions to not commit his troops, Major General Jubal Early sent three brigades into the gap and repulsed the Union breakthrough.

Meanwhile, when Gibbon saw Meade's Division surge forward, he urged his command to follow suit and try to sustain Meade's progress. Jackson countered by ordering forward two brigades commanded by Brigadier General Edward L. Thomas and Brigadier General James H. Lane. As the Yankees approached the railroad tracks separating the two forces, the Rebels unleashed a volley that stalled their advance. Although Gibbon may not have known it at the time, he was facing all three of his brothers who were members of Lane's North Carolina Brigade. By the time Gibbon's men reached the Rebel lines following three valiant charges, both sides ran low on ammunition and resorted to fixing bayonets or using their rifles like clubs.

Meade's attempts to bring forth reinforcements went unanswered. As more than 50,000 Union soldiers stood by in reserve, Confederate counterattacks repulsed the Union attacks. By 3 p.m., the Rebels had regained control of the southern portion of the eight-mile-long battle lines at Fredericksburg, and the Federals had squandered their best opportunity to win the conflict.

Casualties on and around Prospect Hill and the Slaughter Field totaled roughly 9,000. The Union lost 5,000 soldiers (killed, wounded, and missing/captured) while the Confederacy lost 4,000 soldiers.

Marye's Heights—the Valley of Death
As Major General William B. Franklin's Left Grand Division began its assault against Major General Thomas J Jackson's 2nd Corps on the right flank of the Confederate lines eight miles to the south, soldiers from Major General Edwin V. Sumner's Right Grand Division steeled themselves for a diversionary attack against General James Longstreet's 1st Corps on the heights of the river valley directly above Fredericksburg. At roughly 11 a.m. on December 13, the 1st Brigade of Brigadier General William French's 3rd Division, commanded by Brigadier General Nathan Kimball, marched out of Fredericksburg toward Marye's (pronounced Marie's) Heights.

Facing them were about 6,000 Rebel troops aligned along a sunken road behind a four-foot-high stone wall at the base of the ridge. Behind and above the infantry were nine batteries from the elite Washington Artillery of New Orleans on top of Marye's Heights. Loaded with canister and grapeshot, the Confederate's big guns were trained on the open field between the stone wall and the town.

Confounding the Union advance was a mill race that traversed the length the field. Fifteen feet wide and three to five feet deep, the man-made ditch stalled the Federals as they tried to wade across the icy water or pass over the three foot bridges that crossed the waterway. As the Yankees scrambled up the slippery slope on the opposite side, Confederate artillerists and infantrymen mowed them down with a deadly hail of canister, grapeshot, and musket fire. As Lieutenant-Colonel Edward P. Alexander, one of Longstreet's artillery commanders, had boasted before the battle "a chicken could not live on that field when we open up on it." The carnage was so great that Union soldiers later referred to the site as the Valley of Death.

Despite devastating losses against impossible circumstances, Burnside committed nearly all of the right wing of his army in three failed assaults against Marye's Heights by mid-day. The Federals who survived the assaults found themselves pinned down in a swale on the battlefield, unable to move forward or backward without risking death.

By 2:30 in the afternoon, Burnside learned that Franklin's attack against Jackson at Prospect Hill had failed. At that point, the Union leader began to fear that Lee would launch a counterattack at Marye's Heights, and drive the remainder of the right wing of the Army of the Potomac back through the town to the river where it might face annihilation. The best solution Burnside could conger up to save the right wing of his army was to commit his reserves from across the river to even more suicidal assaults against the impregnable Rebel defenses behind the stone wall until he could withdraw what remained of his forces under cover of darkness. Four times during the afternoon and evening, Burnside ordered more Union troops into the Confederate meat grinder. What began that morning as a diversionary assault to prevent Lee from re-deploying troops to the site of the main Union assault at Prospect Hill had morphed into a desperate attempt to trade lives for time to save what remained of the right wing of the Army of the Potomac. Rezultatele au fost devastatoare. The Army of the Potomac lost 8,000 men at Marye's Heights (killed, wounded, and missing/captured), yet not one Union soldier got within fifty yards of the stone wall. By comparison, the Confederacy suffered fewer than 1,000 casualties.

Among the Federal units that suffered horribly during the futile assaults was the famous Irish Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Thomas F. Meagher (pronounced "mar"). Fighting without their battle-worn flag, which was in New York being restored, the Irishmen wore sprigs of boxwood on their hats to identify each other. On the other side of the stone wall stood Colonel Robert McMillan’s Georgia Brigade of Irishmen. As Meagher's men marched in good order toward their doom, chanting the old Irish cheer “Faugh-a-Bellagh” (“Clear the Way”), their fellow countrymen cut them down with a blistering sheet of hot lead. Of the roughly 1,315 Irish Federals who started up the hill, 545 were killed or wounded. The 69th New York lost all 16 of its officers. Despite their staggering losses, Meagher's men advanced farther than any other Union unit that day. Nonetheless, brigade historian Henry Clay Heisler later declared that Burnside's reckless blunder "was not a battle—it was a wholesale slaughter of human beings."

December 14󈝻, 1862
Despite overwhelming losses the day before, Burnside proposed resuming the attack on December 14 during a council of war with his general officers. Following occasional artillery exchanges between the two armies, Burnside acquiesced to the objections of his subordinates and pulled the Army of the Potomac back across the Rappahannock River. On December 15, the Army of Northern Virginia re-occupied the devastated town of Fredericksburg.

Urmări
The Battle of Fredericksburg was the largest conflict of the Civil War. Nearly 200,000 combatants participated in the fighting, producing roughly 18,000 casualties. The Union lost an estimated 12,653 soldiers (1,284 killed, 9,600 wounded, and 1,769 missing). The Confederacy suffered 5,377 casualties (608 killed, 4,116 wounded, and 653 missing). Despite the enormity of the battle and the magnitude of the losses, the Confederate tactical victory had very little strategic impact on the war. The Confederate victory was so absolute that upon viewing the carnage, Lee reported remarked to Longstreet that "It is good that war is so terrible, otherwise we should grow too fond of it."

In the aftermath of the battle, President Lincoln came under extreme criticism in the North, even among Republican allies. Still, the fallout did not dissuade him from issuing the Emancipation Proclamation on January 1, 1863.

Following another failed offensive against Lee's army in late January 1863, derisively known as Burnside's Mud March, the War Department issued General Orders, No. 20 on January 25, announcing that "The President of the United States has directed . . . That Major General A. E. Burnside, at his own request, be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac." The order went on to state "That Major General J. Hooker be assigned to the command of the Army of the Potomac."

In the South, jubilation reigned. Lee and his army became even more convinced of their invincibility. That mindset would serve them well when they collided with the brash Hooker in April at Chancellorsville, but may very well have led to their undoing at the Battle of Gettysburg in July.


Ready to book a room for your own Washington, DC Civil War vacation? Here are some hotel deals to consider:

A vacation to Washington, DC has so much to offer. The options for tourist sites, museums, monuments, restaurants, and fun activities can rival just about any other major city in the United States. The one characteristic that really sets Washington, DC apart from other American cities is the amount of history that can be found both in town and on the doorstep of our nation’s capital in the neighboring areas of Virginia and Maryland.

The Civil War battlefields are a great way to learn about our history and to reflect on the sacrifices made during some of America’s darkest days. Our country is still young compared to many of the other nations around the world, but we have a rich history and fascinating stories that are waiting to be told to those who are interested in listening.

If you’re planning a trip to Washington, DC and you want to venture off the tourist path, then you should definitely consider visiting some of the the nearby American Civil War battlefields.


Priveste filmarea: Bătălia de la Vaslui 1475 Ștefan cel Mare vs Suleiman Pașa (August 2022).

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